A Pivotal Event
Lawyer and Liberal Party politician Jorge Eliécer Gaitán Ayala had completed his apprenticeship by 1928. He was just 25, but only had twenty years to live when the event that would propel him to national attention in Colombia occurred. The United Fruit Company (UFC) has a long history of disreputable conduct in Latin America. Banana workers in the town of Ciénaga, which is near Santa Marta, had been on strike for a month, demanding better conditions, but their strike offended powerful interests abroad.

The UFC and President Calvin Coolidge's administration in the USA – the State Department and US diplomats in Colombia to be precise – were determined that would not happen under any circumstances. In order to break the power of trade unions they demanded punitive action against the strikers from the Colombian government. To achieve that aim Coolidge's administration threatened intervention by US marines if Colombia's President Miguel Abadía Méndez did not take decisive action to protect the interests of UFC.

Abadía buckled under this pressure and sent in the army to arrest the strikers and 'restore order.'

What followed was an outrage under any normal interpretation of the word. On December 6th the  strike was viciously attacked by the Colombian army under the command of General Cortés Vargas. The official version settled on a death toll of 47 with Gaitán and others insisting that the real total was far higher.

The Strike
The strike attracted radical liberals, socilaists and communists around the banana workers' demands for a eight-hour day, six-day week, written contracts and other demands. The US Consulate in Santa Marta and Embassy in Bogotá kept in touch with the State Department in Washington, regularly advising it of developments. The Consul at Santa Marta even requested a warship to stand off the coast rady to act on his say so, but that was refused as the Colombian government had agreed to protect US citizens.

The exchange of telegrams before and after the massacre is revealing. US officials claimed that the strike had changed character, claiming that compatriots' lives were in danger, thereby justifying military action. The potential for a massacre was obvious. Nevertheless, the US diplomats later complained that the liberal press denounced the army and Minister of War as murderers and assassins. The death toll, which the Embassy in Bogotá gloated over, suggests that such descriptions were apt – understated even.

The Massacre
After bowing to pressure Abadía agreed to use the military. They set up positions around the square, knowing that it would be crowded after mass as the crowd waited for the Governor to speak. After a five-minute warning they opened fire indiscrimately. Therefre, there can be little doubt who the real lawless elements were. There were numerous casualties.

General Vargas later said that he gave the order to fire because he had heard that US battleships were poised to attack Colombia if US people and the interests of UFC were not protected. Vargas took responsibility for 47 deaths. Gaitán was outraged by the General's explanation, pointing out that the bullets should instead have been used to protect Colombia from invasion, rather than being used on Colombians. Vargas had protected foreign interests at the expense of Colombian lives.

Vargas' figure was adopted, yet it did not stop José Gregorio Guerrero absurdly claiming that only nine died – eight workers and one soldier. Other's claim the number of casualties reached 2000. The precise toll will never be known, but Gaitán's estimate appears far more reliable than Guerrero's as those arguing that the higher number was accurate had support from an unexpected source. Shamefully dispatches from the US Embassy in Bogotá gloated over the United Fruit Company's estimates of a death toll of over a thousand.

Enraged Reaction
Gaitán was unaware of the communications between the State Departmet and its diplomats in Colombia, but his legal and political skills proved invaluable as he demanded accountability for the massacre, including through Colombia's Senate. The campaign against President Abadía was becoming more and more effective.

The conservative press' attempts to defend the government failed because the policy was disastrous and outrageous. The massacre was indefensible, plain and simple, and Abadía and his party paid the price. Conservative hegemony was coming to end, as the country tired of their policies and the disgraceful attempt to defend the massacre and its bloody aftermath.

Meanwhile, Gaitán's popularity grew considerably and the Santa Marta Massacre convinced many that violence by the state had to be fought with violence against the state. Designed to terrorise the peasants into compliance with the demands of the UFC, the Massacre signalled the end of conservative rule and wilderness years for them and it destroyed the credibility of UFC in Colombia.

The conservatives were swept from power in 1930 – well they should have been. Enrique Olaya Herrera won that election for the Liberal Party – they didn't contest the 1926 poll – and shared ministerial positions with defeated conservatives until liberals pushed them out. Meanwhile, Gaitán's radicalism soon brought him into conflict with the liberals too. Three years into Olaya's Presidency, he left the party and founded his own party the  National Leftist Revolutionary Union (Unión Nacional Izquierdista Revolucionaria {UNIR}) to oppose both liberals and conservatives more effectively in 1933.